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ABSTRACT 
The availability of data on the web and the improvement 
of technologies have made it increasingly easy to reuse 
existing data to create new databases and provide value-
added services. Meanwhile, initial database creators have 
been seeking legal protection for their data. After 
presenting a brief history of legislation related to legal 
protection for non-copyrightable database contents, we 
discuss challenging issues to be considered in formulating 
a database protection regulation. These issues can be 
addressed from the perspective of economics. Results 
from a preliminary economic analysis are presented. The 
findings indicate that depending on investment required to 
create the initial database and the level of differentiation 
between the initial database and the reuser database, the 
choice of a social welfare-enhancing regulation can allow 
for no reuse, free reuse, or fee-paying reuse. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The Web has become the largest data repository on the 
planet1. One of the main factors contributing to the 
success of the Web is its openness and ease of use: 
anyone can contribute data to, and consume data from, the 
Web. As Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the Web, put it 
in an interview by Technology Review in 2004, “the 
exciting thing is serendipitous reuse of data: one person 
puts data up there for one thing, and another person uses it 
another way”. Such serendipitous data reuse is valuable 
and even vital to the development of the Web and the 
emerging Semantic Web. Through reuse, new knowledge 
can be created, innovation and value-added services 
become possible.  
 
                                                 
1 In the ensuing discussion, we will consider a website owner as 
a database creator.  
While we enjoy the availability of data and gain 
increasing capability of reusing data to create value, 
certain data reusers have been legally challenged. For 
example, Bidder’s Edge, a web data reuser that created an 
integrated database by extracting data from more than 100 
auction sites to facilitate easy search of auction items and 
prices, was sued by eBay in 1999. Meanwhile, there has 
been development on the legislative front to regulate data 
reuse activities. The European Union (EU) has introduced 
the Database Directive to restrict unauthorized data 
extraction and data reutilization. In the U.S., six bills have 
been introduced to provide legal protection for database 
contents - none of the six bills were passed into law. The 
significant uncertainty in the U.S. and the apparent 
divergence between the U.S. and the EU in database 
legislation have created serious challenges to the 
“serendipitous reuse of data”.  
 
Many computing professionals develop technologies (e.g., 
web wrapping, web services, and various Semantic Web 
technologies) to make data reuse much easier and more 
effective. It is important that computing professionals are 
aware of the legal implications when these technologies 
are applied for data reuse purposes. We will discuss these 
implications and the issues involved in providing legal 
protection for database contents.  
 
 
2.  eBay v. Bidder’s Edge: Data Reusers Face 
Legal Challenges 
 
With millions of items auctioned at hundreds of online 
auction sites, it can be time consuming to find the specific 
items of interest and keep track of their bidding prices. A 
number of auction data aggregators emerged to address 
the challenge. The aggregators employed computer agents 
to visit auction sites repeatedly and extract data 
automatically. Bidder’s Edge was such an aggregator. It 
gathered bidding data of over five million items from 
more than 100 online auction sites, including eBay’s. 
Bidder’s Edge made it much easier to search and compare 
auction data across multiple sites. However, eBay was 
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concerned with the data extraction and reuse activities of 
Bidder’s Edge. In late 1999, eBay sued Bidder’s Edge and 
won a preliminary injunction in the following year based 
on a controversial interpretation of trespass law in the 
Internet context [2,11]. The case was settled later without 
a court decision. 
 
There have been several other cases involving data reuse. 
A common characteristic in these cases is that the initial 
data compilers or the database creators (e.g., eBay) tend 
to be large and established firms, whereas the data reusers 
(e.g., Bidder’s Edge) tend to be smaller firms using new 
technologies to extract and reuse data from the creator 
databases. Although there has been no definite answer to 
what types of data reuse are legal, certain data reusers 
stopped their activities in fear of the legal threats posed by 
the creators. Existing and emerging technology-enabled 
data reusers continue to face legal challenges. For 
example, data reusers that provide airfare comparison 
services have received warning letters from some online 
travel agencies (See “Cheap-Tickets Sites Try New 
Tactics” by A. Johnson, Wall Street Journal, October 26, 
2004).   
 
These cases have raised several questions regarding 
technology-enabled data reuse: Is it legal? Should it be 
regulated? If so, what are the issues and how should it be 
regulated? We will address these questions in the rest of 
the paper.  
 
 
3.  Feist v. Rural: Non-Creative Database 
Contents Are Not Copyrightable 
 
The immediate reaction of many people is that most 
websites are copyrighted, thus extraction and reutilization 
of the data from these sites may violate copyright law. It 
turns out it is not the case.  When it comes to data, 
copyright in the U.S. protects the original selection and 
arrangement of data, not the data itself or the effort in 
compiling the database. This principle was established in 
a landmark Supreme Court case between Feist 
Publications and Rural Telephone Co (499 US 340, 
1991). 
 
In compiling its phone book covering the service area of 
Rural, Feist copied about 8,000 records of Rural’s White 
Pages. In the appeal case, the Supreme Court decided that 
Feist did not infringe Rural’s copyright in that white 
pages lack the minimal originality to warrant copyright 
protection. This was because arranging entries 
alphabetically does not require any creativity.  
 
Copyright law may evolve and play an important role in 
database protection in the future, but currently it does not 
restrict the reuse of the contents in many databases on the 
Web.  
 
4.  History of Database Legislation 
 
Database creators have tried several ways to protect their 
non-copyrightable database contents. A commonly 
practiced protection is through access control, which often 
requires user subscription and authentication. But this 
does not prevent data extraction if the user provides 
identification to the aggregator (e.g., financial account 
aggregators [10].)  Enforceable contracts to restrict the 
extraction and reuse of the data are difficult to establish 
on the Web unless cumbersome click-throughs are in 
place. This situation lets database creators feel that there 
exists a gap in the existing law which gives them no 
protection to their data and their investment in creating 
databases. As a result, they have started to seek means to 
protect their data through legislation. 
 
The European Union (EU) first introduced the Database 
Directive in 1996 to provide legal protection for database 
contents and to safeguard the investment of database 
makers. Under its reciprocity provision, databases from 
countries that do not offer similar protection to databases 
created by EU nationals are not protected by the Directive 
within the EU. This created a situation where U.S. 
database creators felt they were neither adequately 
protected at home, nor abroad. In response, the database 
industry pushed the Congress to create a new law to 
provide similar protection to database contents. Since 
then, the U.S. has attempted six proposals, all of which 
already failed to pass into law. Figure 1 briefly 
summarizes these legislative proposals.   
 
The sui generis2 right approach taken by the EU creates a 
new type of right in database contents; unauthorized 
extraction and reutilization of the data is an infringement 
of this right. Lawful users are restricted not to “perform 
acts which conflict with normal exploitation of the 
database or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the maker of the database”. Here “the legitimate 
interests” can be broadly interpreted and may not be 
limited to commercial interests. 
 
HR 3531 of 1996 closely followed the EU approach with 
even more stringent restrictions on data reuse. Although 
the Database Directive has been adopted by the EU, HR 
3531 failed in the U.S. One of the main concerns is the 
constitutionality of the scope and strength of the kind of 
protection in the EU Database Directive [3,9,12]. Other 
issues in the EU Database Directive include the ambiguity 
about the minimal level of investment required to qualify 
for protection [7,13], its lack of compulsory license 
provisions [3], the potential of providing perpetual 
protection under its provision of automatic right renewal 
after substantial database update, the ambiguity in what 
constitutes a “substantial” update, and several other issues 
which we discuss in the next section.  
 
                                                 
2 In Latin, meaning “of its own kind”, “unique”. 
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Figure 1. History of Database Protection Legislation 
 
All subsequent U.S. proposals took a misappropriation 
approach where the commercial value of databases is 
explicitly considered. HR 2562 of 1998 and its successor 
HR 354 of 1999 penalize the commercial reutilization of a 
substantial part of a database if the reutilization causes 
harm in the primary or any intended market of the 
database creator. The protection afforded by these 
proposals can be expansive when “intended market” is 
interpreted broadly by the creator. At the other end of the 
spectrum, HR 1858 of 1999 only prevents someone from 
duplicating a database and selling the duplicate in 
competition.  
 
HR 3261 of 2003 has provisions that lie in between the 
extremes of previous proposals. It makes a data reuser 
liable for “making available in commerce” a substantial 
part of another person’s database if  “(1) the database was 
generated, gathered, or maintained through a substantial 
expenditure of financial resources or time; (2) the 
unauthorized making available in commerce occurs in a 
time sensitive manner and inflicts injury on the database 
or a product or service offering access to multiple 
databases; and (3) the ability of other parties to free ride 
on the efforts of the plaintiff would so reduce the 
incentive to produce the product or service that its 
existence or quality would be substantially threatened”. 
The term ‘‘inflicts an injury’’ means “serving as a 
functional equivalent in the same market as the database 
in a manner that causes the displacement, or the 
disruption of the sources, of sales, licenses, advertising, or 
other revenue”.  
 
The purpose of HR 3872 is to prevent misappropriation 
while ensuring adequate access to factual information. It 
disallows only the free-riding that endangers the existence 
or the quality of the creator database. Unlike in HR 3261, 
injury in the form of decreased revenue alone is not an 
offence.  
 
On December 12, 2005, the Commission of European 
Communities [4] issued its first evaluation of the 
Database Directive. The evaluation shows that although 
the Directive helped harmonize copyright laws within the 
EU, the economic impact of the sui generis right on 
database production within the EU is unproven. In 
addition, the scope of the sui generis right has proved to 
the difficult to interpret and its related provisions have 
“caused considerable legal uncertainty, both at the EU 
and national level”. Three policy options were offered in 
the evaluation report: repeal the whole Directive, 
withdraw the sui generis right, or amend the sui generis 
provisions. Similar recommendations appeared much 
earlier from research and education communities in 
Europe [5]. 
 
These legislative initiatives demonstrate the substantial 
difficulties in formulating a database protection law that 
strikes the right balance, which is a central issue in 
dealing with various kinds of intellectual property [1]. 
This issue is often manifested by several concerns, which 
we briefly discuss in the following section. 
 
 
5.  Concerns of Providing Legal Protection 
for Database Contents 
 
Data monopoly. There are situations where data can only 
come from a sole source due to economy of scale in 
database creation or impossibility of duplicating the event 
that generates the data set. For example, no one else but 
eBay itself can generate the bidding data of items 
auctioned on eBay. A law that prevents others from using 
the factual data from a sole source in effect legalizes a 
data monopoly. Downstream value creating reutilizations 
of the data will be endangered by a legal monopoly. The 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) partially addressed this 
issue by trying to distinguish data created from data 
obtained, and by protecting only databases whose data is 
obtained [4].  
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Cost distortion. Both the EU database directive and the 
latest U.S. proposals require substantial expenditure in 
creating the database for it to be qualified for protection. 
Database creators thus may over invest at an inefficient 
level to qualify [14].  
 
Update distortion and eternal protection. This is an issue 
in EU law, which allows for automatic renewal of sui 
generis right once the database is substantially updated. 
Such a provision can induce socially inefficient updates 
and make possible eternal right through frequent updates 
[8].  
 
Constitutionality.  Although the Congress in the U.S. is 
empowered by the Constitution to regulate interstate 
commerce under the Commerce Clause3 and the 
misappropriation approach often gives a database law a 
commercial guise, the restrictions of the Intellectual 
Property Clause4 often apply to any grant of exclusive 
rights in intangibles that diminishes access to public 
domain and imposes significant costs on consumers [6]. 
Most database contents are facts in the public domain; 
disallowing mere extraction for value creating activities 
runs afoul of the very purpose of the Intellectual Property 
Clause that is to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts”. Excessive restrictions on data reuse may 
also violate the Constitution’s First Amendment [5]. Since 
little extra value for the society as a whole is created by 
simply duplicating a database in its entirety, preventing 
verbatim copying of a database is clearly constitutional. 
Extracting all contents of a database is very much like 
duplicating the database. Unlike in copyright law where 
there is a reasonably clear idea-expression dichotomy 
(i.e., copyright protects the expression, not the idea 
conveyed by the expression), the constitutional line-
drawing between extraction and duplication in data reuse 
is very difficult [6]. A constitutional database law needs 
to determine up to how much one is allowed to extract 
database contents.  
 
International harmonization. Given the global reach of 
the Web and increasing international trade, it is desirable 
to have a harmonized data reuse policy across 
jurisdictions worldwide. The EU and the U.S. are 
diverging in their approaches to formulating data reuse 
policies. A World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) study [15] also reveals different opinions from 
other countries and regions.    
 
                                                 
3 Constitution 1.8.3, “To regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes”.  
4 Constitution 1.8.8, “To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries”. 
We believe the solution to these challenges hinges upon 
finding a reasonable balance between protection of 
incentives and promotion of value creation through data 
reuse. With this balance, value creation through data reuse 
is maximally allowed to the extent that the creators still 
have enough incentives to create the databases. Consensus 
can develop for international harmonization if we can 
determine the policy choices that maximize social 
welfare; a database policy so formulated should survive 
the scrutiny of constitutionality; other inefficiencies can 
be avoided or mitigated.  
 
 
6.  Achieving Balance in Database Legislation 
 
We approach the challenge with an economic analysis, 
which considers the commercial value of databases. The 
details of the model can be found in [16]. In addition to 
the factors discussed below, the analysis in [16] also 
considers deficiencies in policy administration and 
discusses cost distortions where a database creator may 
over invest to gain maximum protection. Note that the 
policy choices suggested by the model are based on social 
welfare enhancement, not on fairness to any particular 
party (e.g., the creator, the reuser, or the consumer). 
 
The analysis is based on competition of differentiated 
database products. It considers a database creator, which 
incurs a cost to create the initial database, and a data 
reuser, which extracts a certain amount of data from the 
creator database to create the reuser database. The reuser 
database can be differentiated from the creator database in 
terms of scope (e.g., extracting a fraction of the creator’s 
data, combining it with data from other sources) and 
functionality (e.g., faster search algorithms). The reuser 
uses technology to allow it to easily extract and combine 
data from existing databases so that the cost of creating 
the reuser database can be negligible.  
 
The competition from the reuser database can reduce the 
creator’s revenue. When the reduction is such that the 
creator’s revenue cannot offset its cost of creating the 
database, market fails and policy intervention is needed. 
This is the case where regulation for data reutilization is 
needed, either by creating a new law or by amending 
existing laws.  
 
A regulation potentially can restrict certain stakeholders 
and benefit certain other stakeholders, but the society as a 
whole should better off with the regulation. That is, the 
choices of the regulation should enhance social welfare. 
Our analysis shows that such choices depend on the 
relationship among several factors. The most important 
two are the cost of creating the initial database and the 
level of differentiation between the creator database and 
the reuser database.  Welfare-enhancing choices in 
relation to the two factors are depicted in Figure 2.   
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Figure 2. Welfare-enhancing Choices 
 
When the level of differentiation is low, no reuse should 
be allowed. This is because such reuse adds little value to 
the society, at the same time the intense competition can 
drive the price so low that the creator cannot sustain even 
if the regulation requires the reuser to pay the creator a 
fee. Verbatim copying of an entire database is an extreme 
example of this scenario.  
 
When the level the differentiation is moderate or high, 
there are two scenarios where it is welfare-enhancing to 
allow for free reuse: creation cost is low, or differentiation 
is high regardless of creation cost.  With moderate 
differentiation, competition is not as intense as that in the 
case of low level of differentiation. The softened 
competition allows the creator to make enough revenue to 
offset its cost. When the level of differentiation is high, 
there will be little competition between the creator and the 
reuser. In other words, the data reutilization has little 
impact on the creator.  
 
Although in both cases the regulation could require the 
reuser to pay the creator a fee, from social welfare point 
of view this is not desirable because there is always an 
inefficiency associated with money transfer, which is 
known as transaction cost. The fee can benefit the creator, 
but it does not create any extra value and the society as a 
whole incurs a transaction cost.  
 
When the level of differentiation is moderate but the cost 
of creation is high, the reuser should pay a fee to the 
creator. This is the case where without a fee the reuse 
would cause market failure, but with a fee the creator can 
sustain. Since the creator may not be willing to license its 
data to the reuser, a compulsory licensing provision 
should be in place.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
We have discussed legal issues related to technology-
enabled data reuse, which makes many value-added 
services possible. But certain reuse may diminish the 
incentives of creating the initial databases, in which case 
intervention is needed to balance different interests. We 
presented the results of a preliminary study on how to 
balance the public interests of data reuse and the private 
of interests of profiting from creating the initial databases. 
The results show there is not a one-size-fits-all formula 
for data reuse regulation. Rather, depending on several 
factors, no reuse, free reuse, or fee-paying reuse should be 
allowed.  
 
The implications of our preliminary results can be 
illustrated by revisiting the eBay v. Bidder’s Edge case. 
According to our analysis, we need to at least examine the 
level of differentiation of the database developed by the 
reuser Bidder’s Edge. In terms of searching of bidding 
data, the reuser database has a much broader coverage; 
thus, there is competition from the reuser database. In 
terms of functionality, eBay’s database allows one to buy 
and sell items; the reuser database does not provide any 
actual auction service. Thus the two databases exhibit 
significant differentiation. Searching alone does not, in 
general, reduce eBay’s revenue from its auction service. 
In addition, searching and actual auction are two different 
markets. If we subscribe to the spin-off theory [7], the 
eBay database will not meet the cost criterion. Therefore, 
free reuse by Bidder’s Edge should be allowed. 
  
As technologies for reusing data from various sources 
continue to emerge and improve, the need for 
understanding the legal implications of applying these 
technologies will become increasingly acute. A clear 
understanding of the implications will help legislators to 
formulate regulations with which serendipitous and 
innovative data reutilization can continue to provide 
value-added services without diminishing the incentives 
of compiling databases.  
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